Trinity, Christology, and James White: Theological Concerns (3)

The first two articles in this series have set up the third, which directly addresses the knowledge of the Son in His incarnate state. The first article addressed methodological issues and sought to explain why a divide exists between White and his interlocutors. White’s primary emphasis is the minds of the human authors and the original audience whereas we emphasize the mind of God as revealed in Scripture. This difference manifests itself in the kinds of questions White asks versus our concern with the primary Author. The second article sought to explain how theological exegesis works as it seeks to discern the substructure of text. Ultimately, we are striving to know the theology that precedes, underlies, and is revealed in the text. It is God’s theology, not our theology, that we are after. This theology is intrinsic to the text, which we sought to demonstrate as we located the Spirit in Matthew 24:36. 

Now, we turn our attention to the Son’s statement about His knowledge. Consider the words of the text, which read, “But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father alone” (NASB). What does it mean that the Son does not know? We will answer this question in several steps. 

First, we must identify the subject speaking, which is the second person of the Godhead, the eternal Son. Why do we call Him “Son?” Because He is the One who is eternally begotten of the Father. 

Second, we must ask how the Son is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit. Christians, following the whole of the Scripture, have invariably answered: only by His eternal relation of origin—from the Father. He is God from God. All that the Father has, the Son also has. How is He distinguished from the Spirit? The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. We distinguish the persons of the Godhead (Father, Son, and Spirit), but we do not divide the essence. 

Third, the Son is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit in one other way: He assumed to Himself a human nature. Neither the Father nor the Spirit became incarnate. Neither took on flesh and dwelt among us. The Father is true God. The Spirit is true God. Neither the Father nor the Spirit are true man. The Son is true God and true man. 

Please note, we have not left the text to make these three points. We have merely sought to understand the person speaking in the text in question. He is the incarnate Lord, true God and true man. He is neither the Father nor the Spirit. The person who speaks is the One who took to himself a human nature. How is this person distinguished from the Father and the Spirit? He is distinguished from them as a person but He does not differ from them according to divinity. He does differ from them according to his humanity.

Fourth, we established in the previous post that the word “alone” does not exclude persons of the Godhead, or else the Spirit would be excluded. The Spirit eternally knows the day and the hour of Christ’s return for the same reason that the Father does: they are the omniscient God. 

Fifth, the word “alone” does exclude finite created minds. Angels and men possess no knowledge of the timing of the Son’s return. The Son, being true man, possesses a finite created mind from the time of His incarnation. This is how He differs from the Father and the Spirit, neither of whom assumed a finite created mind. Only a finite mind could lack knowledge. 

Sixth, the Son does not merely possess a finite human mind for He is also the omniscient God. In this respect, He is the same as the Father and the Spirit. 

These final three points build off of the argument found in our previous article. We affirmed that the word “alone” could not exclude the Spirit. “Alone” must be understood to refer to those with finite minds. Jesus has a finite mind, evident by His statement in Matthew 24:36. However, He is also true God and, therefore, the omniscient God. How can it be said that the Son is omniscient and lacking knowledge? Here, we turn to the two natures of Christ. 

White affirms that the Son is God and man. He writes, “Therefore, we are not discussing whether Christ has two natures in one person—no one is arguing against that assertion.” He is correct at this point. However, how the two natures relate to one another and how it might be said that the omniscient Son lacked knowledge is at question. As well as how this confession, this truth he and we both believe, affects our ability to read the Scriptures.

In order to answer this question, we simultaneously affirm that the Son is omniscient and lacking in knowledge because He is true God and true man. As God, He eternally knows all things, including the day and hour of His return, which He decreed from eternity. It is as impossible for the Son to be without omniscience as it is for the Father and the Spirit. Whether necessarily or voluntarily, neither the Father nor the Spirit could forfeit their omniscience or its function. The same is true of the Son. He does not differ from the Father or the Spirit with respect to omniscience. As with the Father and the Spirit, there was never a time when the Son was not omniscient.

How then is He ignorant? The ignorance cannot be attributed to a distinction in the persons, for the persons are only distinguished by relations of origin. Nor can ignorance be attributed to the divine essence, for the Father and the Spirit share the same divine essence. The Son eternally knows the day and the hour according to His divinity. He never was without nor forfeited this knowledge for it is the knowledge of God. Such knowledge cannot be lost or laid aside. The One who speaks in Matthew 24:36 assumed another nature, and herein lies the difference that accounts for the Son’s ignorance. It is of this nature which He speaks. We acknowledge that He differs from the Father and the Spirit as the One who assumed a finite created mind, a mind that did not know the day or the hour. 

We return again to the writings of Francis Turretin. Of Mark 13:32, a parallel passage, he answers how the Son was ignorant, saying, 

“Not by any means (as the Logos [Logos] or Son of God) could he be ignorant of the day, which he himself had predetermined with the Father (Acts 17:31); nor (as he made time) could he be ignorant either of its beginning or of its end; but as man and with respect to his human nature,” (Institutes of Elenctic Theology, XIII.xiii.5). 

We ought not to assume that Turretin would allow us to say that the Son had the knowledge, put aside His use of this knowledge, and then subsequently began using it again. Rather, we must simultaneously affirm that the Son was ignorant and was not ignorant. He continues, 

“Therefore these propositions can be true at the same time, but in different respects (kat’ allo, kai allo): Christ was ignorant of the day of judgment and Christ was not ignorant of the day of judgment. The opposition is made between natures most intimately connected, one of which is not included in the conception of the other” (Institutes of Elenctic Theology, XIII.xiii.5).

We acknowledge that it was the person of the Son who was ignorant. We do not posit Nestorianism to arrive at this conclusion, for it was truly the eternal Son who was ignorant, not another person. Neither do we speak out of both sides of our mouths, for the Son was truly ignorant. According to His human nature, He did not know the day or the hour. But the Son is not merely human; He is also divine. Accordingly, He truly knew the day and hour when He said that the Father alone knew. How can this be? The Son was speaking with reference to His humanity, not His deity. This leads us to the conclusion that Christ, upon assuming a human nature, has two minds. The divine mind, called a mind analogously, and a human mind. With reference to the divine mind, the Son eternally knows. With reference to the human mind, He was ignorant of that time of His return. In our text, the Son speaks with reference to His human nature. 

Our conclusion does not violate the exegesis of the text for several reasons. First, the Son was speaking with reference to His humanity. How do we know this? There is a theological context embedded in the text that God knows all. The Father knows because He is God. The Spirit, likewise, knows because He too is God. The Son, being God, also knows. 

Second, the Son’s use of the word “alone” does not exclude the omniscient God. The same rules that allow us to include the Spirit also allow us to include the Son according to His divinity. The Son is the omniscient God; therefore, the Son is not excluded according to His deity. 

Third, the Son’s use of the word “alone” does exclude finite created minds, which the Son possessed according to His humanity. The Son’s lack of knowledge may be attributed to His humanity but not His deity. Thus, we have two natures without confusion and without change. This is necessary in order for us to affirm that the Lord, whom the Son is, does not change–a theological rule for reading supplied by Scripture (Mal 3:6). The change, lack, or ignorance is attributed to the Son’s humanity, not His deity. 

Fourth, persons act through natures. Either the action referred to in this text–knowing–is attributed to a distinct nature or a confused nature. If it is attributed to a distinct nature, it is either attributed to the humanity or the divinity. If it is attributed to a confused nature, creaturely finitude impinges upon or binds the divine nature of the Son. Everyone is operating with theological categories of persons and natures in this text; it's simply unavoidable. The text and the exegete operate with assumptions about persons and natures. 

In this article, we sought to put forth an interpretation of Matthew 24:36 that was consistent with our exegesis regarding the Holy Spirit. The method that we used to say that the Spirit was not excluded allowed us to say there is a sense in which the Son is not excluded. The omniscient God knows the day and the hour. To deny this claim is to deny that the Spirit knows. To affirm this claim allows us to say that the Son knows or it requires us to say that the Son’s divinity changed because He voluntarily chose not to be omniscient. Since the Son cannot lay aside omniscience any more than the Spirit or the Father can, He must be omniscient for He is the same God as the Father and the Spirit and does not differ from them according to deity. Rather, we say that the Son assumed that which was not omniscient, a human nature, while being the omniscient God. These are not contradictory statements since, as Turretin argued, we are speaking of different natures, both of which properly belong to the Son. In our final piece, we will answer objections posed by White as well as his practical concerns.