Two previous articles laid the groundwork for the discussion of the present article. In the first, we noted that there are different ways of speaking of “will.” One might speak of “will” as the thing willed, the act of willing, or the natural capacity to will. In that article, we sidelined the differentiation (distinction) between the will of decree and the will of precept, since what we are discussing here more appropriately applies to the former than the latter. The next article looked at an historical debate in theology over how the Son wills, concluding in the ecumenical affirmation that the Son has two wills, called dyothelitism (“two-will-ism”). Closing that article, we noted a particular example of the reaffirmation of this doctrine by the Reformed in the work of John Calvin.
Is that where the conversation ends? Unfortunately, no. A debate has raged popularly in the last five years that was more constrained to academic disagreements in the years preceding. The debate is over the question of whether the Son submits to the Father eternally, that is, apart from creation. There are several issues involved in this conversation, including the definition of Nicaea; the authority of church fathers and historical theology more broadly; theological interpretation of Scripture (in the generic sense); and the roles of men and women in the home, church, and broader society. To be slightly overly simplistic in the explanation of the argument for submission, we note that the advocates of submission are generally biblicists who affirm the complementarian roles of men and women in the home. The argument goes (again, being simplistic for the sake of brevity), As God is equal in nature but there is submission from the Son to the Father, so too are men and women equal in nature but there is submission from the woman to the man.
Before continuing on, we should state here explicitly that we are both complementarians, and if anyone were to join us on Baptist Dogmatics, we would require them to be so as well. Rather than grounding our complementarian convictions in a sprint to the Trinity, however, we do so by grounding it in the created order and running to the clear and express commands/prohibitions in Scripture (1 Corinthians 14:34; 1 Timothy 2:12) as well as the relationship between Christ and the Church (Ephesians 5). While we recognize the importance of 1 Corinthians 11:3 for the debate, we also recognize there is a way of understanding the hierarchy Paul explicates within the categories of classical theology (i.e. the two natures of Christ).
Wayne Grudem says, “If we do not have relational differences (historically called subordination in function), then there is no inherent difference in the way the three persons relate to one another, and consequently we do not have the three distinct persons eternally relating in distinctive ways as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (Systematic Theology, 2nd ed., 300). Bypassing the contentious claim that this is the way people have spoken “historically,” we continue with a few more aspects of his argument. He says, “the Son always submits to the authority of the Father and that this aspect of the Father-Son relationship in the Trinity has existed eternally” (301). Later, “the consistent testimony of Scripture is that the Father, by virtue of being Father, eternally has authority to plan, initiate, lead, direct, command, and send, and this is a kind of authority that the Son and Holy Spirit do not have with respect to the Father. The Son, by virtue of being Son, eternally submits, joyfully and with great delight, to the authority of his Father” (304). How this happens internally to the Godhead, i.e. not within the realm of redemption and the second will of Christ, may lead us to concerns that such claims lead to a multiplicity of wills.
However, based on issues we noted in the previous articles, we can not affirm the existence of multiple wills due to the fact that will is a property of nature. Only by affirming such an axiom does the claim of dyothelitism make any sense. If will is a property of Person, why would there be any need to affirm that the Son subsists in two wills? It is not far-fetched, or “fatally flawed,” to move from “the analysis that churches in the seventh century made regarding one topic (the God-man Jesus Christ) and . . . [apply] some of its categories to another topic (the Trinity)” (312, emphasis original). It is incorrect to say, “there are monumental differences because with Christ we are talking only about one person, but with the Trinity we are talking about three persons.” Such a siloed approach to theological methodology leads to dangerous conclusions.
Rather than moving much further into the debate at this point, we do want to point out that Grudem does formally affirm that there is only one will. He states, “The attributes of God are not divided into parts…, and so in speaking about the will of God as an attribute of his nature, there is one will” (307). Later he reiterates, “I agree there is one will in God” (308). Thus, while we believe the notion of eternal, internal submission undermines the right doctrine of the Trinity, we will be careful not to say that Grudem formally denies the singularity of the divine will.
The fact that the Son’s will is the same as the Father’s is what led to such hermeneutical consternation over the prayer, “Not my will but yours be done.” “Obviously,” said the fathers and every other theologian since, “he could not mean not his will in any sense, since his and the Father’s will are one and identical qua Christ’s divinity.” This assumption leads to the need for precision in distinguishing Christ’s two wills.
Such reasoning is an important part of what we understand to be the shortcomings of the proposals for eternal submission. In these proposals, they do not reason “with the grain” of theologians who preceded us. To say “No creed or confession of faith known to me in the history of the church has ever said that the view that the Son is eternally subject to the Father is an unorthodox doctrine,” (313) further demonstrates the lack of sensitivity to previous reasoning. Why would they not feel the need deal with such a question while simultaneously definitely feeling the need to speak of how it could even be possible to talk about the Son’s subordination “according to his humanity” (secundum humanitatem). In fact, the Athanasian Creed clearly states, “In this Trinity, none is before or after, none greater or lesser, but the three Persons are coeternal and coequal… [The Son is] equal to the Father according to divinity.” The reasoning throughout such statements demonstrates the positive affirmation of equality, not the notion that submission internal to the eternal God would be conceivable.