Over the next several weeks, we will publish excerpts from Drew Sparks’ recent article, “In Defense of Classical Theism: A Review Article of Jeffrey Johnson’s The Revealed God.” This article was originally published in the 2024 Journal of International Reformed Baptist Seminary (JIRBS). The editor and Broken Wharfe graciously granted Baptist Dogmatics permission to publish the article on our site.
This first excerpt contains the introduction and begins to analyze Jeffrey Johnson’s book.
In The Revealed God: An Introduction to Biblical Classical Theism, [1] Jeffrey D. Johnson addresses a host of theological and philosophical concerns as he calls Christians to forsake pagan philosophies and know the God of biblical classical theism. The influence of Thomas Aquinas and the related rise of philosophical classical theism concern Johnson. Philosophical classical theism imbibes the pagan philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, risks denying that God is personal, cannot account for creation ex nihilo, and abandons the foundations of a biblical worldview. For Johnson, nothing less than the sufficiency of Scripture is at stake (217–28).
Christians must affirm the sufficiency of Scripture and reject philosophical ideas that contradict its teaching. Here, I agree with Johnson. Attacks against Scripture’s sufficiency and the influence of philosophical ideas that undermine Scripture’s teaching raise their head throughout the history of the church and will do so until Christ returns. Until then, pastors of all ages defend the faith once for all delivered to the saints (Jude 3). Johnson takes up his pastoral pen to warn the church and protect Christ’s bride.
However, I disagree with the particular arguments put forth by Johnson. I hope to ease the concerns he presents in his work and answer objections in this article which serves as a review of and response to The Revealed God. It comes in three sections. In the first section, I analyze Johnson’s book and present his arguments. The second section contains minor criticisms. The third section responds to Johnson’s arguments regarding simplicity, analogical language, and the chain of being.
Analysis
The Revealed God consists of four parts, plus an Introduction. In the Introduction, Johnson puts forth six models of God, each of which considers God’s nature and relation to the universe (11). The six models include deism, classical theism, open theism, process theism, panentheism, and pantheism. These models exist on a sliding scale of transcendence and immanence. He speaks of transcendence in terms of “degrees” and discusses “mediating models” that “uphold some type of balance” (15) as they manage “tension” (14). Johnson places transcendence and immanence in competition without explaining why they are opposite sides of an extreme. He writes, “To what degree is God transcendent, and to what degree is God immanent? Determining the relationship between God’s transcendence and God’s immanence is what separates the different models of God” (13). He also speaks of “utter transcendence” and “utter immanence.” Johnson employs these terms to dismiss views with which he disagrees without explaining why one should deny “utter transcendence” or “utter immanence.” Later in the book, Johnson claims that God’s immanence is related to his operations, leading one to believe that God’s transcendence refers to God’s essence. Mediating models affirm God can be transcendent and immanent but differently emphasize the “transcendental attributes” of simplicity, immutability, and impassibility (15).
Johnson divides classical theism into two categories: philosophical classical theism (PCT) and biblical classical theism (BCT). Johnson does not provide a definition of PCT, otherwise I would supply it for the reader. Like PCT, BCT is undefined. PCT and BCT may be labeled “classical” because each view affirms simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. Johnson claims PCT originated with Plato and Aristotle and can be found in thinkers across the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. Whereas PCT built its system by looking to pagan philosophers who worked independently of holy writings, those who espouse BCT “attempted to construct their doctrine of God exclusively on the Scriptures” (17). Adherents of BCT, such as Calvin and Hodge, affirmed natural revelation but “understood that what is revealed in natural revelation is reaffirmed and expanded upon within the holy writings of the prophets and apostles” (17). Johnson does not tell readers what is “pagan” about pagan philosophy.[2] He mentions Plato and Aristotle and assumes these names suffice to do the heavy lifting. Johnson does not explain why theologians throughout the ages interacted with these pagans rather than others, or how these theologians could critically appropriate their work. Further, Johnson does not tell readers what makes BCT “biblical” other than dependence upon God’s revelation. The philosophical commitments, or lack thereof, of BCT, are unaddressed.
Johnson then highlights six key differences between PCT and BCT. According to Johnson, PCT accepts pagan philosophy, denies that God is personal, identifies God’s essence with his operations, denies self-mobility in God, denies relations by God, and cannot rationally explain creation ex nihilo. BCT rejects pagan philosophy, affirms that God is personal, distinguishes God’s essence from his operations, affirms relations by God, and is rooted in the Creator-creature distinction (23–24).[3] While Johnson intends to address other issues, such as the impersonalism and mutualism found in other models, he aims to show how BCT is solely grounded in divine revelation in contrast to PCT (25). For these reasons, my review and response focus heavily on these two positions.
Having completed his introduction, Johnson begins Part I of the book, where he makes his case for natural revelation. He maintains that natural revelation manifests God’s transcendence and immanence. “Transcendence” Johnson reasons, “speaks of God’s separateness and independence from all that he has created” (30). Immanence is God’s nearness to creation. Using eternity as an example, Johnson writes, “God’s dwelling in eternity outside creation does not prevent him from also drawing near and dwelling within creation” (32). It is not clear what Johnson means when he says that God dwells both outside and within creation. Where is this outside? Where is the space that is not creation where God dwells? Is it above or below creation? Is it to its left or its right? Is it all around? Further, what does it mean for God to dwell inside creation? Is just part of him inside while the other part remains outside? Does he have one foot, so to speak, in each realm? Did he enter creation upon creation? This may explain why Johnson sees tension between transcendence and immanence. He pits them against one another. Instead, one should conceive of transcendence as God’s lack of creaturely limitation. In this view, transcendence explains God’s immanence. Because God suffers no creaturely limitations, he cannot be spatially or temporally distant from creation. God is immanent precisely because he is transcendent.
Why might Johnson place transcendence and immanence in tension? Consider the words of Thomas Weinandy, who writes:
Despite all of the criticism of Greek philosophy, those theologians who conceive of God’s transcendence in opposition to his immanence and so wish to deprive God of some of his transcendence in order to make him immanent are actually working from within a Greek understanding of transcendence. Within Platonic thought, for God to be transcendent meant that he was not only other than the created order, but also far from it. God could not be both transcendent and immanent simultaneously for to be immanent would jeopardize his transcendence. While many contemporary philosophers and theologians rightly wish to make God immanent, in contrast to the Platonic understanding, they are nonetheless still working from within the Platonic understanding of transcendence in that they believe God cannot be wholly transcendent and yet immanent at the same time. Their solution is to make God less transcendent and therefore more immanent, but in so doing, they do what the Greeks feared – make God less than God.[4]
Weinandy demonstrates that Greek philosophy insisted that God’s transcendence precludes his immanence. Ironically, Johnson seems to agree with the Greeks when he sees tension between transcendence and immanence. As an alternative to Johnson’s work, consider again Weinandy’s explanation of the relationship between transcendence and immanence:
Transcendence, by its very nature, only expresses who God is in relation to what he is not, that is, that he is not ‘a part’ of the created order and therefore, as such, transcends it. God’s mode of being God differs then in kind and not just in degree from all else that exists. Equally, to speak of God’s immanence is not to speak of God in himself rather ‘immanence’ specifies that he who is not ‘a part’ of the created order is nonetheless present to and active within it.[5]
As Weinandy rightly points out, God’s transcendence affirms that he is not a part of the created order but this is also why we affirm immanence. God suffers no creaturely limitation nor is he distant from creation, but not because he is somehow “in” or “a part of” creation.
One might respond that Johnson’s use of “outside” and “within” is colloquial. However, consider his criticism of Aquinas: “For Aquinas, God is immanent not because he steps over the transcendental wall and enters our world of time and space, but rather because he as the first cause is represented in every effect” (154). This criticism reveals Johnson’s divide between transcendence and immanence, further muddying the waters. It is difficult to discern whether Johnson’s language is colloquial since his position on God’s relation to time and space is not present in his work. Had Johnson clearly articulated his position, one could discern the implications of his view as it relates to God’s transcendence and immanence as well as the doctrine of divine simplicity.
Johnson continues his positive presentation of natural revelation by arguing that it efficaciously reveals the wisdom from above that God exists, and humans are to submit to him (41). Johnson affirms that natural revelation is clear, continuous, authoritative, instantaneous, free, and universal, but he does not spend time explaining how natural revelation works or differs from natural theology. How God is known and how much about God can be known is left unsaid. In the final chapter of Part I, Johnson states that natural revelation is necessary for a consistent worldview. “A cohesive worldview can only be constructed if we build it upon the revealed truths God has freely given to us” (48). Epistemology appears to play a primary role in worldview formation. Ontology shapes our epistemology but epistemology also shapes our ontology. The relationship between epistemology and metaphysics is unexplained and controversial. Johnson assumes either a reciprocal relationship between the two or grants a greater primacy to epistemology. Either way, epistemology forms and shapes reality. Readers may challenge Johnson’s formulation by arguing that reality is intelligible apart from the constructs of finite created minds. Reality does not depend upon the human mind evidenced by the fact that the human mind is itself a metaphysical reality that does not depend upon epistemology. Johnson’s project assumes a debatable and unarticulated formulation of the relationship between these two disciplines. Johnson seems to conclude that knowledge of God grounds true knowledge of reality and ethics. I use the words “appears” and “seems” because it is difficult to discern Johnson’s own meaning. For example, in one place, he writes:
Without the knowledge of God, mathematicians might be able to explain why 2 + 2 = 4, but they could not explain why numbers exist in the first place. Scientists might be able to uncover the laws of nature corresponding to the laws of mathematics and the forces that govern the natural order, but still, they could not explain why immaterial laws regulate the physical universe. (44)
However, he elsewhere states, “Without the knowledge of God the relativism that postmodern philosophers posit (and wish was true) would be a reality” (44). Again, he writes, “Without knowing a personal God, human beings could not know the laws of morality and logic” (46). Johnson grounds consistency in one’s knowledge of God rather than God’s existence and the intelligibility of the created order.
He might be saying that knowledge of God is required for an ultimate explanation of math and all other disciplines. Or, he may be saying that created reality as a proximate source of knowledge is unintelligible, which is why we need a remote or ultimate explanation. He appears to say as much when he writes:
Without divine revelation from outside the universe, it is impossible to construct a comprehensive and cohesive explanation of reality from within it. When finite, flawed philosophers are left to explain the existence of the cosmos from within, there is no way for them to come to a proper knowledge of the nature of God, who transcends material things. (49)
Natural revelation is outside of the cosmos and distinguished from the created order. Philosophers start from within the created order, which Johnson criticizes. But where should the Christian start? Like the pagan philosopher, the Christian starts within the cosmos by working with created mediums of revelation, whether nature or Scripture. Johnson presents his case as if he desires an epistemology that bypasses created mediums, but the Christian has no such access in this life.
[1] Jeffrey D. Johnson, The Revealed God: An Introduction to Biblical Classical Theism (Conway, AR: Free Grace Press, 2023).
[2] Johnson ought to consider the pattern put forth by Junius and distinguish between philosophy in itself and philosophy in the subject. See, Franciscus Junius, A Treatise on True Theology, trans. David Noe (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 118. Philosophy in itself is the finite but perfect body of knowledge communicated through a finite medium according to the capacity of a finite knower. Philosophy in the subject is the creature’s understanding and participation in true philosophical knowledge. Johnson seems merely to operate with philosophy in the subject, evidenced by the role epistemology and worldview play in his work.
[3] The language of “relations by God” belongs to Johnson.
[4] Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 55 n21.
[5] Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 57.