In three previous articles, we looked at the attribute of “will” in respect to God and considered more the “capacity” of will, or attribute of will, as it comes into the discussions of Christ’s two wills in the mystery of the incarnation and the singularity of the will in contrast to the conception of some who speak of “authority” and “submission” in the Godhead. For the Son to submit to the Father implies or entails a distinct will, which is outside the bounds of historic Christian orthodoxy in that will has been understood as an attribute of nature (hence dyothelitism, or Christ’s two wills), and we confess a singular Divine nature, homoousios.
One thing we continued to sideline in the conversation was the distinction between the decretive and preceptive will. Rather than leave that distinction unaddressed, this and a follow-on article will seek to explain the distinction, drawing chiefly on the work of Francis Turretin. Before we begin, we note that he reminds us “the will in God is only one and most simple, by which he comprehends all things by a single and most simple act so that the sees and understands all things at one glance, yet because it is occupied differently about various objects, it thus happens that in our manner of conception, it may be apprehended as manifold (not in itself and intrinsically on the part of the act of willing, but extrinsically and objectively on the part of the things willed” (Institutes of Elenctic Theology [IET] 1.3.15 [1.202]; à Brakel makes the same point, 1.115). In other words, we begin with a warning that although we are going to be speaking of the “wills” of God, we are doing so only by necessity, due to our created-ness, the need to speak of the simple One by way of complexity.
What is “willed?” Another way to say that is, “What is the end desired?” We must say that there is no higher object of desire, or good end, for God than himself. In van Mastricht words, “the will in God is nothing but his most wise propensity toward himself as the highest end” (Theoretical-Practical Theology [TPT] 1.2.15.8 [2.297]).Thus, the primary object of the will of God is God himself, and all things not-God are secondary, and “not in the same manner;” “himself, indeed, necessarily by complacency, but all other things freely by decree” (IET 1.3.14 [1.218]). What is willed, as it is the good, just, holy, wise, etc. God who wills himself as the final end, must then absolutely be good, just, holy, wise, etc. The end/object is “God himself, [specifically] his own glory. . . . He wills his own glory in all he does; as all things are of him, as the efficient Cause; and through him, as the wise Disposer of them; so they are to him, to his glory, as the final Cause, and last end of all; and this he wills necessarily; he cannot but will his own glory; as ‘he will not give his glory to another;’ he cannot will it to another; that would be to deny himself” (Gill, Body of Divinity, 1.11.3). God “is the ultimate end and the highest good which he cannot but will and love” (IET 1.3.14.5 [1.219]).
God’s will of things not-God is free in that “no created thing is necessary with respect to God” (IET 1.3.14.5 [1.219]). There was no compulsion placed upon God that forced his hand such that things not-God must have been willed by God. What sort of God would we be speaking of if there was some necessity placed upon him to create this or that thing? It would be a God with only relative authority (under whatever compelled him) and a God who was passible (since he would be acting in response). Further, God was not compelled by some divine imperfection to create those things that would make him more perfect. We could imagine an amputee creating a prosthetic limb to perfect his physical body. With God, there was no imperfection compelling him. Lest we imagine that this sounds like an absurd notion—like nobody would claim such imperfection—let us remember that people today regularly claim that God created the world for his companionship, as though he was lacking some object of love and delight that could only be satisfied or perfected or completed by the creation of things not-God. Thoughtful Christians ought never to posit such blasphemy. God’s willing of things not-God is “not to increase but to diffuse his goodness” (IET 1.3.14.9 [1.220]). In other words, he wills things not-God to display his own glory and goodness as a way in which he delights in himself.
Now, there are also some particular items to consider. We should recognize that there are final ends willed and secondary causes. In saying “final ends willed,” we note immediately (borrowing temporal language) a “before” and “after” since “willed” connotes past tense, and “final ends” connotes futurity. Secondary causes might be brought under the language of “concurrence” in that it means those things that attend the horizontal progression of things. We think of what God willed, what he wills, and what the consequence of his will is. The things that follow the decree, the “hypothesis,” or what was willed “beforehand,” necessarily happen. However, we also speak of God willing them “with” time (i.e. concurrence). Thus, à Brakel could say, “He [God] had the freedom of will either to create or not create, or to elect or not elect men. If God has decreed something, however, He wills it of necessity because He has decreed it. That which was a matter of sovereign prerogative before, God now wills of necessity, albeit voluntarily and as a matter of course” (1.115). The immutable God does not change his mind between the determination (decree) and execution of his will.
God’s decretive will is “that which God wills to do or permit; . . . [it] relates to the futurition and the event of things and is the rule of God’s external acts” (IET 1.3.15.2 [1.220]). God declares “the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose’” (Isa. 46:10).